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Introduction
Expertise And The Quest For Rural
Modernization In The Russian
Empire And The Soviet Union
Katja Bruisch and Klaus Gestwa
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from German by Bill Templer
1 The project of modernity is generally associated with industrial and urban contexts.1
Yet the belief that the world can be transformed through knowledge, technology and
reason  has  left  clear  marks beyond  the  classic  laboratories  of  modernity.  In  rural
regions, it manifested itself in the implementation of ambitious agricultural programs
and gigantic infrastructure projects. Such endeavors brought about both adventure and
risk,  promising  unseen  triumphs  and  foreshadowing  ecological  disasters  and  social
upheaval.2 
2 Within a few generations the intended consequences of rural modernization and its
collateral damages radically transformed agricultural production and the rural way of
life.  Concealed behind our daily bread today lies a wide range of different forms of
expertise. In the 20th century, Frank Uekötter writes, “land has become a key resource
in agriculture that has left no area of agronomy untouched, and has even been able to
relativize land ownership as a classic social determinant in rural society.”3 Multiple
instructive questions spring from the insight that in Russia and the Soviet Union in
particular, knowledge was seen as a decisive precondition for increases in yield and
rural development. The answers to those questions provide new perspectives not only
on scientization and modernization within national states but also on transnational
interactions  and  interdependencies—thus  contributing  to  the  global  history  of
agriculture, science and environment.
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Rural modernization : Better and bitter harvests
3 The concept of  “rural  modernization” addressed in this  special  issue should not be
understood  in  the  sense  employed  by  American  social  scientists  such  as  Walt
W. Rostow, who in the decades of the Cold War drew a link between modernization,
democracy  and  capitalism.  In  this  way,  Rostow  tried  to  persuade  governments  in
non‑European countries of the validity and value of the Western model of a progressive
transition  from  traditional  agrarian  society  to  industrial  modernity.4 Rural
modernization as used here refers to the attempt to transform the rural economy and
natural spaces through science, technology and reason, and thus to make them useful
for society.
4 The diverse programs for implementing modernity in rural contexts ranged broadly
from ideas about an agrarian order based on small farms, where education and science
constituted the decisive forces driving rural  development,  to cooperative models of
economy  and  society,  extending  on  to  dreams  of  agriculture  organized  by  the
principles of Taylorism and Fordism.5 During the interwar period, industrial agriculture
served  as  a  benchmark  for  modernization  that  transcended  economic  systems  and
ideologies.6 With a robust faith in the power of progressive technology and efficient
management,  American agronomists  traveled to the Soviet  Union in the belief  that
collectivization had put the country on the threshold of a modern rural economy.7 
5 In the decades after World War II, the success of the Green Revolution appeared to
confirm  the  superiority  of  industrial  agriculture.8 Following  record  harvests  in
Southeast  Asia,  genetically  modified  grain  varieties  and  chemical  fertilizers  were
introduced globally to raise yields. Enthusiasm for scientifically grounded and highly
technologized farming nurtured the fervent hope among many in the East and West, as
well  as  in  the  North and South,  that  it  would  now be  possible  to  overcome global
hunger and social barriers to growth in their own countries. However, it soon became
apparent  that  shifting  “food’s  frontier”9 brought  substantial  ecological  implications
and  went  hand  in  hand  with  violent  interventions  in  existing  agrarian  systems.
Consequently, ever more attention was paid during the final decades of the 20th century
to the “broken promise of agricultural progress.”10 This gave rise to dismay and lasting
disillusionment.11
6 The rural  dimension of  the project  of  modernity shaped the history of  the Russian
Empire and the Soviet Union in particular. The continental climate, with its sometimes
extremely  cold  and  long  winter  periods  and  regular  droughts,  made  agriculture
vulnerable and harvest yields extremely volatile.  At the same time,  agriculture was
central to developing the national economy as a whole. In the 18th and 19th centuries,
the  exports  of  agricultural  products  (flax,  hemp  and,  later,  grain)  stimulated  the
expansion of trade, industry and market relations.12 Agriculture remained a dominant
sector in the Russian Empire, still accounting for 51 % of the national income in 1913.
Russia  played  a  leading  role  on  the  emerging  world  grain  market  until  Stalinist
collectivization.13 In  the  Soviet  Union,  urban  populations  did  not  exceed  rural
populations until 1962.14 In many cases, rural development programs accompanied the
consolidation of imperial rule beyond the political and economic centers. Within the
largely  agrarian peripheries  the  implementation and strengthening of  central  state
authority often required far‑reaching settlement and colonization.15 For that reason,
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rural regions became a regular focus of state activity in the late 19th century.16 After the
1917 Revolution,  Russian  policymakers  grew  more  convinced  that  the  social  order
could be designed and transformed by subjugating nature.  Large‑scale  construction
sites became significant arenas of modernity, even in scarcely developed villages and
remote  natural  spaces.  Those  cases  exemplified  the  state’s  imperative  of  rigorous
expansion and growth and its striving for political dominance, economic power and
cultural hegemony.17 
 
Land : The economic resource
7 Since  the  Neolithic  Revolution,  human  community  has  simply  been  unthinkable
without  agriculture  and  animal  husbandry  for  the  production  of  food,  energy  and
materials.  The  pivotal  role  of  land  often  triggered  social  confrontations.18 Oral
agreements, written rules and visible markers such as fences served to defuse one of
the oldest social causes for conflict. The precise regulation of land access—and in many
cases water access—led to comprehensive bodies of law whose aim was to provide a
legal  foundation  for  using  this  scare  and  contested  resource.  While  being  both  a
creative and destructive cultural force, land laws are so basic a phenomenon that they
arise even where there is no state to enforce them.19 
8 Land enclosure was central to rural development in England during the early modern
period. In the mid 18th-century, the government intensified support for the removal of
common  property  rights  and  the  consolidation  of  fields  to  make  the  land  more
profitable.  Contemporaries and historians alike have regarded enclosure,  which was
often enforced against the will of the rural population, as a precondition for England’s
agricultural and industrial “revolutions.” However, it has been shown that in the end
productivity and yields were not necessarily higher on enclosed lands.20 
9 The close relationship between property and power had a technological dimension as
well.  To  better  demarcate  and secure  the  land,  the  Americans  Lucien B. Smith and
Joseph F. Gidden independently from each other invented barbed wire in the second
half of the 19th century. Its technical simplicity, low production costs and multiple uses
contributed to the triumph of the “devil’s rope” in prairie fences, battlefield trenches
and all manner of detention camps. In the case of agriculture, barbed wire proved to be
not only an effective means of border demarcation but also functioned as a political
dispositif of separation, driving the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, conquest and
subjugation.  As modernity’s  veritable crown of  thorns,  barbed wire has remained a
simple yet effective means of power in the control of space and land, livestock and
people.21 
10 All attempts at regulation notwithstanding, land has repeatedly been an object of social
confrontation and dispute. Russian and Soviet history highlight these dynamics most
notably. From the abolition of serfdom under Alexander II to the Stolypin Reform and
the Revolution of 1917, the search for an expedient apportionment of land was a topic
of intense debate, affecting legislation, politics, philosophy, and even literature.22 In his
short  story  “How  Much  Land  Does  a  Man  Need ?”  (1886),  Lev  Tolstoi  sought  to
determine  how  much  land  was  actually  appropriate  for  a  farmer.23 The  Stolypin
Reforms, which aimed at overcoming communal practices of land use in open fields,
pursued  an  “administrative  utopia”  of  a  rationally  ordered  rural  economy.  The
peasants’ fields were to be clearly separated from one another and agriculture was to
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be optimally adapted to the demands of the market.24 After the February Revolution,
when peasants began to appropriate landowners’ land, politicians and scientists sought
to create rules and regulations to curb the chaos in the villages.25 
11 During the Soviet period, the rejection of “bourgeois” relations of ownership and the
dream of large‑scale enterprises shaped agrarian discourse and agrarian policy. While
the coercive collectivization of the village at the beginning of the 1930s was driven by
the wish of the Stalinist elite to subjugate rural regions, the belief in economies of scale
determined Nikita S. Khrushchev’s ultimately unsuccessful amalgamation campaign.26
Up until the Soviet Union’s end, officials in the Party and the government continued to
debate  on  how  much  farmland  should  be  allotted  to  individual  households  for
independent agricultural production.27 
 
Soil : The natural resource
12 While  land  is  an  economic  and  political  category,  soil  stands  for  the  “uneasy
relationship”  between  agriculture  and  the  natural  environment.28 Farming  often
reduces the productive capacity of the soil ; processes of degradation, especially as a
result of erosion, salinization and compression, lead to losses in agricultural surface
area. This affects not only individual farmers and local communities ; in extreme cases
soil degradation can trigger famine, mass migrations and wars over land and water.
That is why the UN Food and Agricultural Organization declared 2015 the International
Year of Soils, seeking to raise awareness about the importance of soil for global food
security, the preservation of biodiversity and the stabilization of the climate.29 
13 The problems identified by the United Nations are by no means new. In recent years,
fascinating  yet  disquieting  studies  have  acknowledged  soil  as  a  defining  factor  of
human  history.  In  his  influential  environmental  history  of  the  20th century,  John
R. McNeill stresses that the “earth’s skin,” which is rarely more than hip‑deep, takes
centuries to build up but only a short time to degrade through inappropriate land use.
The  thin  fertile  crust  of  the  earth is  “the  basic  of  human  survival,  the  source  of
sustenance  for  plants,  the  foundry  of  life.”30 The  geo‑morphologist  David
R. Montgomery  has  emphatically  warned  that  “we  are  skinning  our  planet.”  In  his
cultural and social history of soil from ancient to modern times Montgomery identifies
soil as “our most underappreciated, least valued, and yet essential natural resource”
and argues that more historical research is urgently needed in order to illustrate that
social orders “rely as much on soil conservation and stewardship as on technological
innovations.”31 Using the example of dust storms, a special issue of Global Environment
has recently demonstrated that soil degradation is a promising field of research. Its
history still has to be written, with narratives mirroring the ambivalent experiences of
both destruction and revitalization, as well as of ignorance and betterment. Without
any doubt, studies on soil exhaustion provide instructive views on the interconnections
between agrarian, cultural and environmental histories.32
14 In Russia, the management of soil has been a concern for intellectual and political elites
since the 19th century. The pioneering soil  scientist Vasilii  V. Dokuchaev (1846‑1903)
sought more appropriate ways to farm the fertile black earth and semi‑arid regions. He
argued  that  the steppe  environment  suffered  from  widespread  soil  erosion  and  a
growing  vulnerability  to  aridity  because  settlers  ignored  local environmental
constraints.33 The “Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature of 1948”—at that
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point  the  “world’s  largest  ecological  engineering  project”34—borrowed  from
Dokuchaev’s idea to afforest the steppe, providing for the planting of huge shelterbelts,
the development of  protective  tree  lines  and the stabilization of  sandy soils.35 Two
years  later,  a  further  series  of  decrees  ordered  the  construction  of  dams  and
hydroelectric power plants as well as a huge network of irrigation canals on the Volga,
Don  and  Dniepr.  Celebrated  as  the  “The  Great  Stalin  Construction  Works  of
Communism” (Stalinskie Velikie Stroiki kommunizma), these projects sought to transform
the  entire  south  of  the  Soviet  Union  by  means  of  an  “ecological  revolution”  in
“flourishing  stretches  of  land.”  In  the  end,  the  plan  proved  abortive  due  to  its
overblown scale and the absurdities of the Soviet command economy.36 
15 Yet failure could also inspire debates about more careful ways to use the soil. In the
1960s, Khrushchev’s Virgin Land Program sustained a heavy setback due to severe dust
storms. In light of the environmental effects of the expansion of farming in the steps,
Soviet  agronomists  drew  from  Canadian  experiences  with  dryland  farming,
non‑inverting  tillage,  contour  plowing  and  the  beneficial  role  of  stubble  and  crop
residues.  Lamenting  that  Soviet  agriculture  seriously  lagged  behind  in  soil
conversation,  they  started  to  introduce  measures  similar  to  those  employed in  the
North  American  prairies  and  to  produce  farm  equipment  modeled  on  Canadian
prototypes.37
16 Closely related to the careless use of  soil  were Soviet endeavors in irrigation.  They
illustrate  the  constraints  on  agriculture  stemming  from climatic  and  other  natural
conditions. The second half of the 20th century has been called “irrigation’s modern
era.”38 Over the course of fifty years irrigated agricultural land increased worldwide
from 100 million to 271 million hectares. At the beginning of the 21st century, around
20 percent  of  the  agricultural  land  was  under  artificial  irrigation,  providing  over
40 percent of total global agricultural yields.39 In the second half of the 20th century, the
south of the Ukraine and Russia and the dry zones of the Soviet Central Asian republics
became  prominent  showplaces  of  the  hazards  of  large‑scale  irrigation.  The  water
diverted into open fields often washed salt into the topsoil from the earth below. It
accumulated in the roots of arable crops, causing significant losses. As a result, more
agricultural  land  was  ultimately  lost  than  proved  possible  to  regain  through
improvement projects. Irrigation, once promising, turned out to be a threat.40 
 
People : The social resource
17 Soil has been cultivated in many different ways through history, yet land was often
worthless without the people who worked on it.41 Until the end of serfdom the wealth
of a Russian landowner was measured not by the land he possessed but by the number
of “souls” he could call his own.42 After the emancipation of the serfs, the government,
private companies and settler communities relied on a large workforce for agricultural
production. In the Tsarist period the allotment of land and taxation exemptions for
colonists were central for farming in remote regions.43 As part of the Stolypin agrarian
reforms and the construction of the Trans‑Siberian Railway, the Tsarist government
promoted the resettlement of peasants to the fertile steppe regions of western Siberia.
Between 1897 and 1911, 3.5 million persons left the European part of the Empire in a
scramble  for  land  handed  out  by  the  government.  They  reclaimed  areas  that  for
centuries had been used by Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads for grazing their cattle herds.
Expertise And The Quest For Rural Modernization In The Russian Empire And The...
Cahiers du monde russe, 57/1 | 2016
5
In 1910 the Siberian peasants increased butter production and achieved a notable grain
surplus,  which served to  boost  Russian  agricultural  exports.  At  the  same time,  the
nomads were pushed southward as the new agricultural production threatened their
way of life.44
18 During collectivization, peasants and nomads were forced onto collective farms, where
they  often  lived  in  extreme  poverty  as  cheap  and  ready  labor.  This  merciless
exploitation of the village was what enabled the massive transfer of resources from
agriculture  to  the  industrial  sector.  Because  kolkhoz  peasants  were  no  longer
permitted to migrate legally into the cities after 1932, many used semi‑legal ways to
leave their villages. Due to this continued subjugation by the Soviet party state, rural
residents dubbed the Stalinist collectivization the “second serfdom.”45 In addition, the
authorities willingly used forced labor in the Stalinist period. Millions of people were
compelled  to  work  the  land  and  tend  to  the  animals—in  Gulag  camps,  special
settlements  and  labor  battalions.46 After  1953,  the  Soviet  leadership  relied  on
large‑scale campaigns, such as Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands Campaign, instead of forced
labor to mobilize workers for their ambitious agricultural projects.47 
19 Ever  since  their  coming  into  power,  the  Soviet  government  had  claimed to  seek  a
balance  between  urban  and  rural  regions.  But  differences  in  living  standards  and
income remained so great that ever more kolkhoz members turned their backs on the
countryside for better jobs in industrial urban areas. In the 1970s, thousands of villages
disappeared from the map, while Soviet agriculture faced a constant shortage of young
specialists. Despite full‑bodied party conference resolutions and governmental decrees,
mechanization and electrification in many places  were delayed and the great  leaps
promised never came.48 
 
Expertise : Turning visions into practice
20 Equipped with specialist  knowledge and skills,  experts  played an important  role  in
pre‑modern  societies.  Their  number  was  small,  though,  hence  their  influence  was
limited to certain professional fields.49 With the rise of modernity, the state’s growing
aspirations to intervene in every sphere of social and natural life enhanced the role of
professional  political  advisors.  Scientization and rationalization pluralized expertise
and increased the numbers of experts significantly. As social change accelerated since
the 19th century,  political  and economic elites  sought to  back up their  decisions by
qualified opinions,  which lent  political  importance and social  prestige  to  scientists,
engineers  and  professional  administrators.  These  experts  “were  not  only  entirely
self‑motivated and self‑created ; rather, they were shaped by their interactions with
political and social  actors.”50 They furnished those in power with tools for thought,
arguments for decisions and scripts for action.51 As a result of their growing influence,
scientific  advisors were even labeled as the “fifth branch of  government.”52 Indeed,
there is good reason to describe the 20th century as the century of the expert.53 
21 The management of land, soil and people required knowledge about agriculture as well
as about the social and natural characteristics of rural regions. Knowledge also served
to legitimize any attempts to transform nature and landscapes. But knowledge alone
did not suffice to reshape rural regions in accordance with the demands of modern
economies  and  modern  states.  It  also  had  to  be  administratively  regulated  and
contained, to be recognized as a relevant resource and systematically implemented into
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practice. Decisive for this transformation of knowledge into expertise was the belief
that the world could be refashioned. “Generated in the framework of the relationship
between  science  and  power,  with  its  own  claims  of  validity  and  forms  of
representation,”54 expertise  is  not  merely  an  attribute  of  especially  educated  or
experienced  individuals.  It  also  enables  humans  to  transform  physical  and  social
environments.
22 In 2002, the German historian Margit Szöllösi‑Janze called the agrarian sciences “one of
the last really large unexplored ‘blind spots’ in the sphere of the history of science.”55
Since then a lot has changed. Recent studies have shown that agricultural sciences and
their  related  disciplines  became  important  political  resources  in  the  18th century,
facilitating  the  integration  of  rural  spaces  into  national  economies  and  state
bureaucracies.  Initially,  scientific  societies  played  a  key  role  in  the  generation  of
agricultural  knowledge.56 As  the  demand  for  products  from  plant  cultivation  and
animal breeding increased with urbanization, so did political and popular interest in
soil and life sciences.57 The great leap in scientization at the end of the 19 th century
established  new  institutions  and  organizations  and  introduced  new  methods  of
cultivation  and  farm  machinery  that  brought an  upsurge  in  agrarian  knowledge
production.58 
23 Calculability and efficiency were considered decisive prerequisites for the realization of
a rural modernity. Economic success should no longer depend on the vagaries of the
weather  or  an  allegedly  incompetent  rural  population.  Instead,  efficient  forms  of
organization, scientifically grounded prognoses and technical innovation promised to
predict  agricultural  yields  and to guarantee reliable  rates  of  growth.  Scientists  and
engineers found a new role in society as experts, opening the door for them to embark
on the reordering of agrarian economy and village life.59 
24 In the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, the production of knowledge about the
rural peripheries was bound up inseparably with the integration of those regions and
with the wish for more predictability in agricultural  production.60 Beginning in the
early 19th century, agrarian experts were needed for the “scientization of the social”61
as well as for the “industrialization of nature.”62 After Alexander II’s Great Reforms,
specialists found new career options in the bodies of local self‑government (zemstvo)
and, after the Russian Revolution of 1905, in educational institutions, associations and
cooperatives.  They advised the rural  population on agricultural  questions,  collected
extensive  data  on  rural  living  standards,  carried  out  experiments  and  championed
hygiene standards.63 The peasants in turn increasingly made their voices heard beyond
the village, eventually making their way into elite discourse.64 
25 At  the  same  time,  numerous  forums  for  scientific  exchange,  such  as  scholarly
conventions, periodicals, agricultural schools and traveling exhibitions promoted the
flow of information and the popularization of knowledge.65 The Russian Empire and
early  Soviet  Union  were  fully  involved  in  the  transnational  circulation  of  agrarian
knowledge and practices.66 In the Paris World Exhibition of 1889 and 1890, the Russian
pavilion’s 280 exhibits on soil science enjoyed great public interest.67 In the following
decades, the soil scientist Vasil´ii  V. Dokuchaev, the geneticist Nikolai I. Vavilov, the
landscape  geographer  Lev  S. Berg  and the  economists  Aleksandr  V. Chaianov  and
Nikolai  D. Kondrat´ev  became  internationally  recognized  authorities  in  their
disciplines.68 
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26 The supplementation of generalists by well‑trained specialists, which had started in the
late Imperial period, accelerated after the 1917 Revolution.69 The Bolsheviks abolished
the  public  sphere  and  subjected  scientific  expertise  to  state  control.70 The  fate  of
numerous Soviet specialists showed that the power of experts depended on whether
they were recognized by the ruling elites.  Experts were likely to become targets of
critique when reality could not be reordered as planners envisioned. During Stalinism
many fell victim to state terror.71 
27 The repression of prominent agronomists went hand in hand with the rise of the Soviet
biologist  Trofim  D. Lysenko.  With  the  aid  of  Stalin’s  personal  backing,  Lysenko
promulgated his pseudo‑scientific theory of heredity at a specially convened congress
of the All‑Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences in August 1948. In show‑trial
style the congress branded genetics a “bourgeois pseudo‑science.” Promoting the idea
of “creative Darwinism” Lysenko became the “virtual dictator of Soviet biological and
agricultural science.”72 Lysenko’s career proves that in the Soviet context “scientificity”
(nauchnost´) and ideology were often closely linked. Thus, “expertise was […] not first
and  foremost  a  technical  question,  but  a  political  one,  including  its  symbolic
dimensions as well as its presentations.”73 At the same time, Lysenkoism illustrates the
nexus between competence and arrogance that is a common feature in the history of
expertise.74
28 Subjugation and repression were not  the only  features  of  the relationship between
experts and the state in the Soviet Union. In the post‑Stalinist period, scientists of the
rural  areas,  especially  ethnologists,  geographers,  sociologists  and  soil  scientists,
reconsolidated  their  disciplines  and  entered  the  arena  of  international  scientific
communities.75 During the years of perestroika, well‑known agronomists rose to the
circle of advisors of Mikhail S. Gorbachev. This development challenges “the image of
specialists  as  passive policy actors,  dependent entirely upon the Soviet  leadership.”
Instead, as Neil J. Melvin argues, it points to the “cumulative significance of specialist
participation” in challenging existing basic concepts. In the area of rural policy, the
fundamental contribution of experts that began long before 1985 was “to redefine the
scope of the policy issues, to significantly shape the broad outlook of the elite on the
nature of the countryside and its problems.”76
 
The agrarian paradox : Harvest failure and ecological
devastation
29 In contrast to scientific projections and political recognition of expert knowledge about
the countryside, the economic and ecological outcomes of rural modernization were
often disappointing. The devastating famines of 1891/92, 1921/22, 1932‑34 and 1946‑48
revealed rural  inefficiency,  disorganization and political  failure.77 Despite periods of
accelerating agricultural growth,78 the level of agricultural production and the living
standards in rural peripheries remained low relative to Western Europe and the United
States, causing constant headaches for the authorities. Rural peripheries remained an
important field of politics up until the late Soviet period.79 In the 1980s, with an almost
limitless  supply  of  funds,  the  Soviet  countryside  witnessed  “the  highest
food‑and‑agriculture subsidy known in human history.”80 Nonetheless, the agricultural
sector remained the veritable Achilles  heel  of  the economy.  Beginning in 1963,  the
Soviet Union depended on ever more grain and meat imports from capitalist countries
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to compensate for frequent crop failures. Given that the Soviet Union possessed the
world’s largest area of arable land, this was a major embarrassment for the country’s
leadership.81 In frustration, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet Kremlin leader, candidly
described Soviet agriculture as a “hopeless liability on the national economy, a sort of
bottomless pit absorbing immense resources.”82 
30 Authorities  often  tried  to  compensate  for  poor  production  with  the  unrestrained
deployment of heavy machinery and chemicals and the expansion of cultivation areas.
This went along with massive environmental damage and serious health problems for
millions of Soviet citizens.83 A state commission report in 1993 noted that since the
1950s a fourth of  the land under cultivation had been eroded on the territory now
belonging to the Russian Federation. As a result, a third of the fields and meadows was
lost or severely damaged.84 The most dramatic proof of the disastrous consequences of
Soviet  agricultural  policy  has  been  the  steady  shrinkage  of  the  Aral  Sea  after  its
tributaries were diverted for cotton irrigation.85
31 The tension between the scientization of rural affairs on the one hand and regular crop
failures and massive environmental destruction on the other raises questions around
which this special issue centers. What did political elites and experts understand by
rural  modernization ?  Did  experts  assist  the  authorities  by  providing  them  with
detailed knowledge and improvement proposals within already defined frameworks ?
Or did they conceive of new programs, set new aims and mark out new paths ? Was
expertise  more  than  a  source of  legitimacy  and  argumentative  arsenal  for  the
authorities ? What relevance did the ruling elites ascribe to scientific knowledge and
engineering expertise for the implementation of their agenda ? Invariably associated
with these questions are others : What impact did politics have on the scientization of
rural affairs ? What were the consequences of the pursuit of modernizing policies for
the  rural  population ?  Was  reliance  on  expertise  a  reason  for  the  undesirable
developments and setbacks in agriculture ? 
32 Linking agrarian and environmental history with the history of sciences and politics,
the case studies contained in this special issue show how knowledge was transformed
into expertise and the role played by experts in the attempts to modernize the Russian
Empire and Soviet Union. The authors explore how researchers and engineers acted in
science, politics and the public sphere, and describe the strategies they used to gain
recognition beyond their professional communities as mediators between the state and
rural society. In doing so, the authors illuminate the creative power of expertise as well
as its institutional, political and environ-mental limitations. 
 
Regulating land use
33 From the Great Reforms in the mid‑19th century to the end of the Soviet period, the
codification of landed property and the distribution of land were repeatedly focus of
intense scientific and political debate. Three articles in this special issue show that the
surveying,  categorization and allotment of  land occurred at  the interface of  power,
economy and morality.  Officials,  experts  and the rural  population legitimized their
ideas with arguments about economic necessity and social justice. Even so, complex
property relations and local interests frequently blocked the path toward realizing an
ideal  rural  order.  The  legal,  economic  and  moral  dimensions  of  land  use  were
intrinsically intertwined, in theory as well as in practice.
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34 In his contribution, Igor´ Khristoforov shows that the promotion and enforcement of
private property rights proceeded sluggishly up until the late imperial period. After the
Great Reforms, the state claimed an increasingly prominent role in rural peripheries of
the Empire. With the establishment of private land ownership, however, this claim was
not  enforceable  because  the  surveyors  lacked  authority  over  the  rural  population.
Representatives  of  the  landed  gentry  counted  on  informal  agreements  whereas
peasants feared that the surveyors represented foreign interests. The two groups were
pursuing different aims, yet they were united in their reluctance to accept outsiders
interfering with local affairs.
35 The question concerning the appropriateness of landed property and economic profit
remained  a  constant  theme  even  after  the  caesura  of  1917.  David  Darrow’s  article
demonstrates that for more than half a century the reforms of Alexander II served as a
benchmark for land use rights. In the revolutionary period, parties and experts from all
political  camps,  and  also  peasants  themselves  referred  to  the  category  of  nadel
(allotment) that had passed into law with the abolition of serfdom in 1861 in order to
define criteria for the allotment of land. Their proposals for providing a just rural order
in line with objective criteria avowed the moral obligation of the state to secure land
for the peasant population.
36 What was the proper and permitted extent of land to be allotted to the rural population
for  its  own  use ?  That  question  continued  to  be  relevant  even  decades  after
collectivization. In her contribution, Katja Bruisch shows that agrarian discourse in the
Soviet period was closely intertwined with changing notions of socialism. Household
farming, a concession made by the Soviet state after the collectivization, came to be
recognized as an integral part of the socialist village during the 1970s. The official turn
toward subsidiary farming was legitimized by reference to the complementary function
of household farming, which did not compete with collective or state‑run enterprises.
Moreover, Soviet leaders acknowledged private agriculture as an important part of the
country’s food production. The private use of land now seemed compatible with the
socialist aspirations of the Soviet state.
 
Economic and political interests as determinants of
expertise
37 The agency of experts fluctuated widely in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Even though they presented their knowledge as universally applicable, economic and
political interests were always decisive factors in their reputation and influence. 
38 Susan Smith‑Peter presents a case study of how agricultural societies spread agrarian
knowledge among the landed gentry. In the 1830s,  the Moscow Agricultural Society
began to promote the sugar beet industry by providing entrepreneurs with seed and
technical expertise. However, economic factors and the natural environment proved
more decisive than the support by scholarly societies. The sandy and loamy soils in
Right‑bank Ukraine were vast and entrepreneurs had access to free labor. As a result,
the region evolved into a hub for sugar beet cultivation and processing in the Russian
Empire. 
39 Within the entanglement of science, economy and politics, new forums for exchanging
knowledge developed and transcended the borders of the Russian Empire. In her article
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on  irrigation  experts  in  Central  Asia,  Maya  Peterson  explores  how  transnationally
generated knowledge was implemented in a concrete local  setting.  Focusing on the
interplay between political and economic interests in the context of colonial expansion,
Peterson shows that in the early 20th century, programs for irrigation were considered
a key part of imperial policy. Hydraulic engineers worked closely with experts from the
United  States,  whose  experiences  in  the  American  West  proved  useful  for  the
management  of  scarce  water  resources  in  Turkestan.  Even  as  technical  knowledge
moved across continents, its application followed national interests. Russian experts,
supported by the central government, used their knowledge to help cultivate cotton in
the region and prepare the way for Russian settlers. Though the Tsarist government
failed to transform the steppes and deserts of Central Asia into fertile landscapes, the
dream outlasted the Russian Empire and opened numerous possibilities for hydraulic
experts during Soviet rule. 
40 Olessia Kirtchik explores how in the years of perestroika the rural economy became a
major field of state politics. Different groups of agro‑economic experts tried to push
through their agendas with policymakers.  While reform‑minded economists favored
the introduction of free‑market incentives and the privatization of agriculture, experts
within the classic  institutions of  Soviet  agrarian science advocated the retention of
collective  farming.  Kirtchik’s  contribution  shows  that  expertise,  irrespective  of  its
technocratic  appearance,  frequently  is  embedded  in  a  larger  political  agenda.
Gorbachev’s decision for close cooperation with the reform‑oriented experts, too, was
ultimately politically motivated. 
 
Conflicts and constraints
41 Even as experts acquired a host of ways to apply their knowledge, success was anything
but certain. Often, complex relationships between various actors and institutions as
well  as the interplay between man, technology and nature set narrow limits to the
realization of their visions. For many experts, conflicts and constraints were therefore
part and parcel of their professional experience. 
42 As Stephen Brain  shows in  his  article,  institutional  factors  sometimes  impeded the
successful  application of  scientific  expertise.  The  Tsarist  government entrusted  the
Russian Army of the Don and the Vladikavkaz Railroad Company with afforestation in
the  steppe  region  to  curb  soil  erosion  in  the  19th century.  But  the  foresters  who
journeyed to the south of the Empire faced rigid regulations, often making it impossible
to fulfill their task. In addition, soil conservation for the involved institutions, as Brain
notes, was only of secondary importance. The afforestation programs achieved some
short‑term success, yet did little to contain erosion in the long run. 
43 Along with institutional factors, power affected the influence of experts. In his article,
Stephan Merl explores why a revolution in agricultural yields in the era of Stalin failed
to materialize.  Merl  notes that Soviet specialists  lacked the authority to implement
their proposals despite repeated attempts in the 1920s and 1930s to rationalize farming
by consolidating land and providing farms with high‑grade seed. The centrally planned
production targets for state grain supplies were not conducive to sustained increases in
yields,  when  at  the  same  time,  agrarian  experts  were  reprimanded  whenever  the
harvests fell short of the quotas. The balance sheet of Stalin’s policy was disastrous. The
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rural population lost interest in their work and agriculture remained a lasting concern
of the Soviet government. 
44 In  some  cases,  terror  and  repression  obstructed  rural  modernization,  as  Christian
Teichmann describes  in  his  analysis  of  the  Vakhsh River  Valley  project  during the
1930s.  Soviet  planners  had  hoped  that  the  construction  of  irrigation  canals  in  the
Soviet republic of Tadzhikistan would expand arable land for cultivating cotton. Yet the
political atmosphere of Stalinism fomented mistrust amongst engineers, and many lost
their  lives  during  the  reign  of  terror.  In  addition,  insufficient  food  supplies  and
miserable living conditions—including malaria and typhus—debilitated the workforce.
Moreover, the rivers could not be controlled effectively by the planners which caused
uncontrolled flooding, eventually salinizing the earth. Instead of a blooming oasis, the
project created a salty desert. 
 
Research agenda of the special issue
45 Analyzing intellectual, social, technological, and natural conditions, the authors in this
special issue show that rural orders are determined not only by human intentions and
interactions,  but  also  by  the  interplay  of administrative  procedures  and  cultural
assignments.  Since  agriculture  relies  heavily  on  living  resources  (soil,  plants  and
animals),  the  processes  and  results  of  rural  modernization  have  often  differed
significantly from modern interventions in the urban and industrial sectors.86 After the
assemblages of land, soil, people and expertise are unraveled, Timothy Mitchell writes,
“human agency appears less as a calculating intelligence directing social outcomes and
more as the product of a series of alliances in which the human element is never wholly
in control.”87 This issue’s case studies prove that agriculture, as David Moon pointed
out,  provides  “fertile  ground  for  innovation  in  conceptualizing  human‑nature
relationships.”88
46 This special issue is devoted to exploring how great political caesurae like the collapse
of  the  Russian  and  Soviet  empires  and  the  rise  of  Stalinism  and  perestroika
reconfigured established fields of expertise. Political change often motivated experts to
rethink their trajectories and to reconsider how their knowledge could be used. At the
same  time,  the  wide  historical  scope—from  the  early  19th century  to  the  1980s—
uncovers continuities that outlasted those changes. Studying the development of rural
expertise over a long timeframe thus helps to establish a more adequate narrative of
the rise of modernity by reconsidering the impact of political turning points on the
history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. 
47 The scientization of rural affairs was an international phenomenon, and expertise often
developed and proliferated through transnational exchange. As the case studies show,
however, the authority and the impact of experts always depended on the political and
social structures in which they were embedded. Rural modernization was intrinsically
linked to the decisive role of the state in the organization of technology, science and
reason.89 Addressing  the  complex  relationship  between  national  and  international
affiliations,  the  contributions  in  this  special  issue  exemplify  that  the  “fate  of  the
expert” is “to operate somewhere between a universalist understanding of his or her
expertise […] and the politically or culturally defined requirement of the state.”90 
48 Instead of retelling the old story of agrarian backwardness, this special issue provides
revealing insights  into  the rise  of  modernity  in  the Russian Empire  and the Soviet
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Union. The aim here is not so much to add to an incomplete picture as to open up new
views on the role of experts in the transformation of rural regions. The articles help
understand the agrarian paradox of Russian and Soviet history : On the one hand, the
scientization of  rural  affairs  was a  prominent trend in the Russian Empire and the
Soviet  Union.  The  rise  of  knowledge  and  expertise  was  central  to  economic
development,  social  progress  and identity in rural  regions,  all  of  which shaped the
thinking and acting of contemporaries. On the other hand, even as scientific experts
and engineers promoted rural modernization the outcomes of their initiatives were
ambiguous, ranging from complicated bureaucratic reforms to the failure of grandiose
projects. 
49 Rural modernization was never only an aim in itself. It was also a means through which
to maintain or establish the power of the Tsarist and later the Soviet state in remote
regions.  In  many  cases,  expertise  served  the  larger  political  interests  of  internal
colonization  and empire‑building.  Conversely,  the  state  could  obstruct  the  work  of
experts  when it  feared the loss  of  influence in one of  the most  important areas of
policy‑making. Faced with this complex interplay of power, expertise and economy,
rural modernization programs often fell short of expectations. In some cases, they even
engendered tremendous social and ecological costs, leaving in their wake unfulfilled
promises instead of scientifically and technologically driven progress.
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